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Abstract:  It is believed that the adoption of 
Interorganizational systems (IOS) can enable organization to 
use the information processing capabilities to reduce 
coordination costs and improve performance. However, the 
past researches have shown mixed results about the impact 
of IOS on coordination costs. While drawing on transaction 
cost analysis, this paper suggests that analyzing the 
association of IOS use and coordination costs of 
interorganizations should consider different levels of asset 
specificity. To illustrate the explanatory power of this 
analysis, this paper presents a case study from China. The 
findings from the case study show that, when asset 
specificity is high, IOS use can reduce coordination costs for 
monitoring or cooperative purpose. While under a condition 
of low asset specificity, the association between IOS use and 
coordination costs is negative.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The recent increased interests focused on cooperative 
relationships across organizational boundaries have put great 
emphasis on interorganizational system (IOS) issues. IOS is 
firstly defined by Cash and Konsynski [5] as “an automated 
information system shared by two or more companies”. 
These kinds of systems are different from intra-
organizational and distributed information systems by 
exchanging information across organizational boundaries. 
Although a number of researchers have demonstrated that in 
an interorganizational relationship, the adoption of IOS 
could enable organization to use the information processing 
capabilities to decrease costs and strengthen relationships 
among participating organizations and as thus improve 
performance [17], the past researches have also shown 
mixed results about the impact of IOS on the performance of 
participating organizations. For instance, Hengst and Sol 
[11] have introduced transaction cost theory to study the 
impact of information and communication technology (ICT) 
on coordinate activities among organizations. They argue 
that using of ICT can lower coordination costs and they 
assert there exists a positive relationship between benefits 
gained from coordination and the level of ICT applied. But 
on the other hand, they acknowledge that using of ICT will  
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also increase the complexity of coordination, such as 
inducing more communication activities and more 
information processing. 
Such problem implies that we should analyze the impact 
of information system in coordinating activities among 
organizations under different conditions. This paper 
addresses this problem by analyzing how the use of IOS 
affects coordination costs under different levels of asset 
specificity. Based on our analyzing method, this article 
presents a case study about IOS using of a manufacturing 
firm from China. From this case study, we try to investigate 
the attitude of firms towards the effect of IOS use under 
different environments. 
This paper, in the next section, reviews the primary 
contributions and arguments of transaction cost analysis in 
the context of interorganizational relationships. In the 
subsequent section, we present hypotheses to discuss 
possible directions to the impact of IOS use on coordination 
costs among firms under different conditions. Next, we 
describe the case study from perspectives of managers to 
explain the power of this framework. This paper ends with 
conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
II.  Implications of Transaction Cost Analysis 
 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) has focused on the 
appropriation concerns in interorganizational relationships, 
which are originated from pervasive behavior uncertainty 
and contracting problems. The basic assumption underlying 
the TCA perspective is that the specific governance form is 
based on an economizing on transaction costs. Williamson 
[18] argues that the total costs of an organization are 
consisted of production costs and coordination costs. An 
organization should choose a proper governance form 
according to a trade-off between the advantage of low 
coordination costs in the case of hierarchies and low 
production costs in the case of markets.  
Asset specificity and environmental uncertainty are the 
key dimensions of TCA that are used to predict the 
boundaries of a given firm. The concept of environmental 
uncertainty plays a major role in TCA which is referred to 
circumstance surrounding an exchange cannot be specified 
ex ante. Considering environmental uncertainty is beyond 
the control of an organization, we take environmental 
uncertainty being substantial as the premise of our analysis. 
Asset specificity refers to physical assets, production 
facilities, tools and knowledge tailored to a specific 
relationship that cannot be re-deployed for other purposes 
without the sacrifice of productive value. When entering an 
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interorganizational relationship, participants usually have to 
invest on assets with specific use only in this relationship. 
As regarding the manufacturing industry, a firm should, 
which is looking for appropriate supplier, make great effort 
on searching and evaluating the potential partners. This may 
consume a lot of capital, labors and time to establish and 
maintain the cooperative relationship. Besides, the 
participants might take the risk to be locked-in by special 
production equipment, computer technology and related 
interorganizational systems that link the buyer’s and 
supplier’s scheduling and production activities. As asset 
specificity becomes substantial, interdependency is 
deepened and coordination is needed for safeguarding the 
appropriation concerns.  
Past researches have studied the association of 
coordination costs and asset specificity under substantial 
environmental uncertainty [2][4][9]. Their findings 
suggested that substantial asset specificity would create 
bilateral dependence and reduce the firm’s control over its 
business partner. Therefore, the firm’s coordination costs 
might increase [2][8][9]. For example, in the study of buyer-
supplier alliance, Anderson and Buvik [1] have confirmed 
that the association between buyer’s asset specificity and 
buyer’s coordination costs was positive. Figure 1 illustrates 
the association between coordination cost and asset 
specificity. 
 
 
III.  Analysis of IOS and Coordination Cost 
 
With the rapid development and diffusion of computers and 
telecommunications in the past decades, organizations can 
be able to extend the range of cooperation with other 
organizations based on information systems. Initially, the 
adoption of Interorganizational systems enables participating 
organizations to use the information processing capabilities 
to improve performance and to strengthen relationships with 
other organizations sharing the IOS. Therefore, IOS are 
widely adopted in industries such as airlines, banking and 
transport [17]. Nowadays, it is realized that cooperation and 
interdependence with other organizations are vital and 
information technology is an important enabler to such 
interorganizational activities. To address the influence of 
IOS, some researchers have investigated the efficiency 
advantages in transactions gained by IOS. Malone et al [14], 
Gurbaxani and Whang [10], Clemens et al [6] point out that 
using of IOS has a positive impact on the cost to coordinate 
activities between organizations and leads to competitive 
advantages.  At the same time, other researchers have 
identified disadvantageous effects of using IOS, such as the 
risks of becoming locked in with system and relationship 
specific investments and the issues of changes in bargaining 
power between firms [3][6][13] . 
We argue that the mixed findings about the effect of IOS 
on interorganizational coordination cost relate to the 
influence of asset specificity and interdependency. Therefore, 
the analysis of impact of IOS should be discussed under 
different conditions.  
There are different forces of information system to 
influence the coordinative activities between firms. 
Gallivant and Depledge [7] classified them as monitoring 
effect and collaborative effect. The monitoring use of IOS is 
to ensure trading partners will act as expected to avoid 
opportunism and moral hazards. While the collaborative use 
of IOS is contributed to facilitate knowledge transfer and 
information share among partners. Based on such category 
of effect of IOS, we establish our analytical framework 
below. 
When analyzing the impact of IOS use on 
interorganizational coordination cost, it must be realized that 
investments on IOS should enhance the level of total asset 
specificity [12][16]. Because IOS is built with interface and 
information exchange procedure which is proprietary to a 
particular group of firms, therefore, firms wishing to join the 
network often need to invest in the special hardware and 
software for the system. Besides, any trading partner should 
put into effort to train its personnel to operate such system 
which is perhaps unique to others [13]. Support for this 
argument has been provided by Nidumolu [15]. His findings 
manifest that specific investments of IOS will bring about 
great switching costs among firms involved in a buyer-seller 
relationship. The result leads to increasing bargaining power 
for the firm initiating the IOS which is against other business 
partners’ favor. 
According to TCA, when organization is confronted with 
external uncertainty, the introduction of interorganizational 
relationships may conflict with the safeguarding problem 
incurred by substantial investments in specific assets [4]. 
Consequently, under conditions of substantial asset 
specificity, IOS may be used to monitor and control over 
other party’s behavior to avoid them taking advantage upon 
the situation or exercising opportunistic behavior. Therefore, 
gains by use of IOS are predicted to be much more dominant 
than the negative influence of additional asset specificity 
added by the investment of IOS.  
On the other conditions of low asset specificity, analysis 
of impact from IOS using is somewhat complexity. In 
accordance with TCA, low asset specificity induces no 
substantial safeguarding problem and interorganizational 
coordination is an appropriate adaptation response to 
environmental uncertainty. As a result, IOS is introduced to 
facilitate the coordination among business partners. 
However, under this circumstance, using of IOS may bring 
about great risks to both initiators and participants of 
systems. On the one hand, investment on system should 
increase asset specificity of initiators which means that they 
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FIGURE 1: Association between coordination 
cost and asset specificity 
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are facing a risk to suffer from the anticipated opportunistic 
behavior of other organizations. While for participants, 
owing to have no control on the operation over system, they 
would be locked-in by this system and might face the 
possibility to be impropriated by the initiators. Therefore, to 
alleviate the conflict originated from IOS, all the 
organizations should put into more efforts to coordinate with 
each other to achieve their common interests. Based on this 
reasoning, we hypothesis: 
H1: Under conditions of high asset specificity, the 
association between investment in IOS and 
interorganizational coordination costs is negative. 
H2: Under conditions of low asset specificity, there is a 
positive association between investment in IOS and 
coordination costs among trading partners. 
Our hypothesized relationships between IOS use and 
interorganizational coordination costs are summarized in 
figure 2. 
 
 
IV. A Case Study of Manufacturing Firm in 
China 
 
To examine our research analysis, firstly we make a survey 
to investigate the using of IOS in Chinese manufacturing 
industry. Under the pressure of global competence, more and 
more firms have formed IOS-based inter-firm relationships 
to achieve competitive advantage. Our survey shows that 
more than 70% of firms have participated in certain kind of 
interorganizational system with their business partners. Most 
informants recognize they are motivated by the potential 
ability of systems to access greater quantity of better quality 
information. Nevertheless, they have different opinions on 
the decreasing effect of coordination cost by virtue of IOS. 
To illustrate our analytic method, here we select a firm 
located at Xiamen, a coastal city of China, for case study.  
Amoi Electronic Corporation is a multinational 
electronic enterprise, which highly focuses on developing 
and manufacturing products from telecommunication, digital 
video and audio to IT industry. Nowadays Amoi has become 
an internationally well-known leading manufacturer and 
supplier of mobile phones in China. In 2003, this firm has 
employed about 20,000 persons and the total sales reached 
850 millions US dollar.  
This firm has established its own interorganizational 
information system which has designed interface with its 
intra-organizational information systems. Participants of this 
IOS include Amoi’s primary suppliers and distributors. For 
instance, Tianma Microelectronics Corporation (TMC) is an 
important supplier who provides mobile phone used liquid 
crystal display (LCD) for Amoi.  
Since its business partners are mostly located in other 
cities all over China, managers of Amoi claim the operation 
of IOS has a crucial role on reducing communication costs 
and saving time of transaction. Nevertheless, considering the 
ability of reducing total interorganizational coordination 
costs by IOS, the situation is somewhat complexity 
according to different trading partners.  
When considering its supplier, Amoi recognizes TMC as 
one of its most important business partners. The reason is 
that mobile phone is Amoi’s most profitable kind of 
production and cutting costs is just the fundamental aspect to 
win competent advantage over drastic telecommunication 
product market. Another reason is that the supply of screen 
for mobile phone demands high degree of customization. 
Therefore, Amoi has spent a huge time, labors and capital to 
certify and adapt its designing and manufacturing processes 
for selected LCD. That means Amoi has invested high level 
of specific asset with TMC. If the supplier has any changes 
on R&D or output of LCD, and if Amoi cannot collect such 
information in time, that would bring about enormous 
damage to the producing arrangement of Amoi. To avoid 
contingency happening, or even being misappropriated, 
Amoi uses IOS to monitor this supplier’s plan of R&D and 
throughput. On the side of TMC, it also benefit from using 
of this system. Because they can get the right demands from 
Amoi beforehand, that would be useful for them to arrange 
their manufacturing program. As a result, managers of Amoi 
acknowledge that they have experienced savings of 
coordination cost with TMC through IOS.  
As for relationships with its distributors, both Amoi and 
distributors have no need to invest substantial specific asset 
to hold the bilateral cooperative relationships. Under such 
circumstance, Amoi faces a dilemma situation. On one hand, 
Amoi depends on distributors to occupy market. So this 
information system can assist Amoi to monitor sale activities 
of distributors’ in time. On the other hand, distributors sell 
not only products of Amoi, but also the same kind products 
of others. Therefore, all the two parties have some extent of 
doubt. Amoi has a worry about secret leakage when using 
this system. And from distributors’ perspective, they want to 
keep control of their business and remain independent from 
manufacturer. This leads to low level of interdependent 
relationships among them. Consequently, managers of Amoi 
claim that they cannot perceive significant reduction of 
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FIGURE 2: Impact of IOS use on coordination 
cost under different level of asset specificity 
IOS investment 
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coordination cost with distributors from using of IOS. 
 
V. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
It is pervasively believed that interorganizational systems 
can play an important role in coordinating activities between 
organizations. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that the 
adoption of IOS can enable organization to use the 
information processing capabilities to reduce coordination 
costs and improve performance. However, the past 
researches show mixed results about the impact of IOS on 
the coordination costs. Some researches provide favorable 
evidences to this suggestion [10][14], while other results 
give no significant support to it [3][13]. This paper focuses 
on the possible conditions under which IOS use can 
positively affect coordination of activities between firms. 
According to transaction cost analysis, under external 
uncertainty environment, asset specificity becomes the 
primary issues to influence coordinative patterns between 
business partners. From the perspective of technology, IOS 
may be used as a collaborative platform to share knowledge 
and facilitate knowledge transfer between firms [7]. 
Moreover, organizations usually use IOS as a control 
mechanism to monitor the business partners. In general, the 
monitoring use of information system is applied to alleviate 
risks induced by investment on specific asset, while the 
cooperative use of information system is to strengthen 
bilateral cooperative relationships. On the other hand, 
investment on system should increase asset specificity of 
initiators which means that they are facing a risk to suffer 
from the anticipated opportunistic behavior of other 
organizations. 
This paper discusses impact of IOS use on 
interorganizational cost under two situations of asset 
specificity. If a high level of asset specificity exists, 
organizations have to put more coordinative efforts to 
maintain the cooperative relationships. Upon that, gains by 
use of IOS are predicted to be much more dominant than the 
negative influence of additional asset specificity added by 
the investment of IOS. However, on the conditions of low 
asset specificity, investment on system should increase asset 
specificity. As a result, IOS use has a potential to increase 
interorganizational coordination cost.  
At last, a case study is presented here to investigate IOS 
use in manufacturing industry from China in accordance 
with our framework. The findings from the case study 
demonstrate researching direction of our method.  
Though the findings of this study provide valuable 
insights, there are still a lot of works need for further 
research. For instance, considering the shortage of case 
study method, it is essential to require quantitatively 
methods examining large number of IOS use from a wide 
extent. Second, because of diversified goals, abundant 
development and operation of IOS, association of 
information technology use and coordination cost under 
economic conditions needs to be examined in a much 
broader context incorporating more types of IOS. 
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